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"Maximizing the Environmental Benefits per Dollar Expended": 
An Economic Interpretation and Review of Agricultural Environmental Benefits and Costs 
Gregory L. Poe I 
I. Introduction 
In a notable departure from previous farm legislation, the 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement 
and Reform Act (FAIR - the 1996 Farm Bill) expressed the intent that Conservation Title programs 
should 'maximize the environmental benefits per dollar expended". This new environmental focus 
is not only a potential harbinger of a philosophical shift in Federal environmentallegi lation, but has 
fiscal prominence because Conservation Title expenditures exceed $2 billion annually. Replacing 
supply control, least-cost or physical criteria (e.g., acres, tons of erosion) approaches previously 
employed in Conservation Title program', it is anticipated that this new emphasis on environmental 
benefits maximization will lead to a substantial geographical reorientation of acreage enrollment 
[Ribaudo, 1989; Ribaudo et al., 1994; Heimlich, 1994; Kuch and Ogg, 1996]. As agencies and 
society move to promulgate and implement rules and practices to meet this mandate, it is critical to 
establish a common understanding of the meaning and magnitude of agricultural environmental 
benefits, and to incorporate these concepts and values into program design. 
The broad objectives of this paper are to pr vide an overview of the economic policy 
foundations underlying the 1996 Farm Bill language and to survey research to date that has 
Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural, Resource, and Managerial Econornics, 
Cornell University. Helpful comments, without implication, on earlier drafts of this manuscript by 
Nelson Bills, Jonell Blakeley, and Duane Chapman, Cornell University are greatly appreciated. 
Sections of this text previou ly appeared in the author's paper ARME E.B. 94-16 entitled "Extra­
Market Considerations in Farmland and Agricultural Policy" and presentation "The Social Costs of 
Agricultural Pollution to the Watershed Community" published in the proceedings of the NRAES-96 
conference on Animal Agriculture and the Environment: Nutrients, Pathogens, and Community 
Relations. The interested reader is also referred to a more eXlensive discussion on agricultural 
environmental policy options provided in "Extra-Market Values and Conflicting Agri ultural 
Environmental Policies" forthcoming in Choices, 1997. 
attempted to quantify agricultural environmental benefits. The paper is organized around these two 
themes. Section II provides a background for non-economists on fundamental concepts in 
environmental benefit estimation and non-market valuation. In addition to establishing an historical 
policy and theoretical perspective on such estimates, techniques used to measure these value are 
briefly introduced and classified. Section III discusses these techniques in greater detail by using 
examples taken from prior valuation research on agricultural environmental benefits. Reflecting 
historical emphases in valuation research, this section concentrates on separate expo ition of 
positive (amenity values) and negative (ground and surface waters). The final section assimilates 
the findings from the previous research and identifies areas for future policy and research. While 
the text tries to provide an introductory overview of basic principles and central citations, selected 
suggestions for advanced readings on valuation theory and methods are provided throughout. 
Importantly this paper both follows and challenges the mainstream of non-market valuation 
research and policy in this area. Most of the presentation remains within the dominant agricultural 
environmental policy and research paradigm by maintaining a separation between the positive and 
negative externalities of agriculture. Yet, it is argued in the final section that such a unilateral 
approach is artificial and inappropriate if the goals of such policy are truly to maximize the 
environmental benefits of agricultural land use. Both policy and research need to be redesigned to 
address this issue. 
II. Economic and Policy Concepts 
In order to understand the reasons that economists seek to quantify, in monetary terms, the benefits 
and costs of policies and government actions, and argue for public sector intervention in 
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environmental issues, it is helpful to have some background in welfare economics and the notion of 
market failure. As a first step, one should distinguish welfare economics from welfare programs that 
focus on public relief programs. Welfare economics is a branch of economics oriented toward 
evaluating policies and actions under the assumption that the goal of society is to maximize the total 
well-being that society derives from goods and services which people produce and consume, 
including those provided by natural resources and environmental quality. Alternatively stated, it is 
assumed that society's objectives should be to attain the highest good for the greatest number of 
people. Using this criterion, welfare economists compare alternative policies or states of the world, 
typically using the present situation as a reference point. For example, a welfare economist might 
ask if the welfare of society would be improved by imposing agricultural environmental best 
management practices on dairy farms in New York, compared with the current status of manure 
management2 . But, "... at this point, a fundamental question arises: How can the well-being of a 
whole society, say the citizens of New York, be conceptualized? How is society's welfare to be 
defined?" [Bishop, 1987,24].3 
To create a conceptual framework for making such evaluations, economists ha e relied on 
two basic value jUdgements. First, individuals are the sole judges of their own well being -- i.e, I an 
2 This is not a simple hypothetical policy i' ue. As discussed in a recent article by R. T. 
McGuire [1993], the former New York State Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets, this is a 
multimillion, indeed multibillion, policy question for New York City and other watersheds because 
of filtration avoidance criteria imposed by the 1986 amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act. 
The 1990 Coastal Zone Act Reautborization Amendments have the potential to regulate over two­
thirds of farmland in New York State [Poe, 1995] and impose substantial costs on certain farms 
[HeimJich and Bernard, 1995]. 
3 The presentation in this and the following paragraphs builds upon the initial structure
 
developed by Bishop [1987] in an excellent expository paper "Economic Values Defined".
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determine whether a particular change makes me better or worse off, while you can best asses, 
whether it is good or bad for you. Yet, under this assumption, neither of u is entitled to judge 
whether a particular change increases or worsens the other's well-being. Second, social welfare 
should be somehow defined in terms of the aggregated welfare of individuals. 
A logical f'/xtension of these value judgements is the so-called Pareto Criterion, named for 
a philosopher who first formalized these concepts at the tum of the century [Pareto, 1909; Little, 
1950]. This criterion states that society should adopt only Pareto Improving projects or policies that 
make at least one person better off and no one worse off, and a Pareto Efficient situation is said to 
exist when no one can be made better off without making at least one person worse off. Continuing 
with the manure management example, the Pareto Criterion would say that social welfare will 
increase with the manure management regulations only if it makes water consumers and/or non-farm 
neighbors better off while making none of the affected farmers worse off. 
Few would debate the desirability of policies that meet the Pareto Criterion -- How could we 
complain about making someone belter off without harming anyone? Yet, reliance on this principle 
as the basis for public decision making L impractical and would lead to social paralysis. By their 
very nature, real world policy decisions involve tradeoffs between people or groups implying that 
policy decisions must result in some winners and some losers. In our example, if one farmer is made 
worse off then the project should not be adopted under the Pareto Criterion. Adopting a more 
pragmatic stance, applied welfare economics has modified the Pareto Criterion in the form of the 
compensation test. This test states that a policy is socially beneficial if the winners from the action 
(i.e., the people who feel that they would be made better off with the policy in place) could, in 
principle, fully compensate the losers (i.e., the people who feel that they would be made worse off) 
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and s ill be better off. With respect to manure management regulation, the compensation te t 
would require tbat the people who benefit from improved ground and surface water quality be able 
to compensate the farmers for their lost profits (and other non-pecuniary incon eniences), and still 
feel better off after having paid the compensation. 
It is this test, as well as the need to express disparate inputs and outcomes in a common 
metric, that provides the motivation for assigning monetary values to benefits and costs. On one 
hand, we need to measure the maximum willingness to pay for the policy cbange -- i.e. the econ mic 
benefits of the proposal. We also need to compare this with costs of the policy change or the 
minimum amount required to fully compensate losers. Of course, this approach is based on ethical 
premises that have obvious problems and very few economists would claim that tbe compensation 
test should serve as the sole criterion for social decision making4• A critical limitation is that the 
compensation test is a purely hypothetical exercise wherein the "in principle" clause is of 
fundamental importance -- actual compensation is typically not paids. Thus, there will be some 
winner and some losers under any policy choice even when the compensation test is passed. As 
such, the test ignores equity issues' it focuses only on maximizing the size of the economic pie rather 
than investigating how the pie is divided. It also does not account for the rights of future generations 
and non-human species. At an equally fundamental level, there is a question of the ethos of trading 
off environmental quality for income as implied by the compensation test. Yet, in spite of these 
ethicallirnitations, the compensation test should be regarded as one of possibly several fundamental 
4 Indeed, a sub et of economists decry the use of benefit-cost analysis a the basis for making 
policy decisions. See, for example, the article by Vatn and Bromley, 1994. 
SBecause actual compensation is not required, this test is also referred to as the potential 
Pareto improvement criterion. Historically, these concepts stem from seminal contributions by 
Kaldor [1939J and Hicks [1939J and have thus also been called the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. 
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criteria for policy decisions. All we "economists are saying is that society may want to think twice 
about doing things when those who would be made better off could not fully compensate those who 
wou Id be harmed ... in case, that fail the compensation test, would it not make sense to clearly and 
objectively consider reasons for going ahead?" [Bishop, 1987, p. 26.] 
It is important to note at this point that such comparisons are not isolated academic musing, 
but instead have long been an essential component of Federal policy making. Whereas the 
theoretical foundations of welfare economics trace their origins to Dupuit's [1844] classic 
demonstration that the total social value of a bridge exceeds the tolls paid, contemporary applications 
and theoretical developments find their impetus in a few key lines in the Flood Control Act of 1936 
[Dorfman, 1976]: 
... the Federal Government should improve or participate in the improvement of 
navigable waters or their tributaries, including watersheds therefore, for flood control 
purposes if the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are in excess of the estimated 
costs ... , (emphasis added) 
In subsequent years, the scope of "benefits to whomsoever they may accrue" has been larified and 
extended beyond flood control issue and actual expenditures in a series of Federal statutes (e.g., the 
1950 "Green Book" by the Federal Inter-Agency River Basin Corn.m.jttee), Executive Orders (e.g., 
Reagan's 1981 E.O. 12291), and legal rulings (e.g., the 1989 State of Ohio v. United States 
Department of Interior ruling).6 Importantly, in contrast to the original Flood Control Act focus on 
use value, both theory and policy now ree gnize the need to incorporate non-use values such as 
option values (I may use the resource in the future) as well as existence (l want to protect a resource 
regard1e s of whether it is used), altruistic (I want the resource to provide benefit to other ), and 
6Hanemann [1992] provide. an informative overview of the evolution and broadening of 
environmental benefit-cost theory and policy. 
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bequest (l want the resource to be available to future generations) motives. 
Interestingly as a digression, major water quality acts such as the Clean Water Act and the 
Safe Drinking Water Act have prohibited trade-offs or compar; ons between economic costs and 
health or other benefits, providing some of the fodder for renewed Congressional interest in benefit-
cost analysis requirements for major guidances and regulations [Portney, 1995]. Senator Musk.ie's 
impassioned response in leading the fight to override President Nixon's benefit-cost motivat d veto 
of the Clean Water Act demonstrates the type of argument used against applying benefit- ost 
analyses to environmental legislation [Adler et al., 1993, p. 2];" 
Can we afford clean water? Can we afford rivers and lakes and streams and oceans 
which continue to make life possible on this planet? Can we afford life itself? Tho e 
questions were never asked as we destroyed the waters of our Nation, and they 
deserve no answers as we finally move to restore and renew them. These questions 
answer themselves. And those who say that raising the amounts of money called for 
in this legislation may require higher taxes, or that spending this money may 
contribute to inflation simply do not understand ... this crisis. 
Presently, however, there is a felt need among policy makers to "rationalize" environmental policy 
decision, and calls that policies adhere to fundamental precepts of benefit-cost analysis are heard 
across the political spectrum. In proclaiming a regulatory philosophy, President Clinton's 1993 
Executive Order 12866 states that agencies should adopt regulations "only upon a reasoned 
determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify the costs." Legislation passed by 
the "Contract with America" dominated 104th Congress similarly maintained that no regulation shall 
be promulgated unless "the incremental risk reduction or other benefits of any strategy chosen will 
be likely to justify and be reasonably related to, the incremental costs incurred by ... public and 
private entities" [H.R. 9, Sec. 422], or alternatively, that the "guidance maximiz s net benefits to 
­
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society" [H.R. 961, Sec. 324r. The Conservation Title language of the 1996 Farm Bill corresponds 
with these principles as demonstrated by the legislative intent that Conservation Title programs 
"maximize the environmental benefits per dollar expended". 
But how do we estimate these values? Economists have long relied on market prices as a 
signal of economic values and a basis for determining social benefits and costs. The rationale 
supporting this approach is that market exchanges involve voluntary transactions in which 
participants are concerned with their own best interests. In choosing whether or not to purchase a 
parcel of land, for example, I implicitly weigh the value of that land against the value of all the other 
goods that I must give up to purchase it. Thus, in making such a market decision, I am said to reveal 
my preferences. If I decide to purchase the land at a given price, then the value J place on that land 
is greater than the opportunity costs, measured in dollars, of all other goods that I have to give up 
to buy the parcel. In contrast, the relative value of the land and the other goods is reversed if I 
decide not to buy it. At some intermediate price level I will be indifferent between purchasing the 
land and not purchasing the land. This price is said to be my maximum willingness to pay for the 
land. When aggregated across all other possible land purchasers and different quantities/qualities 
of land to provide a demand function, such values are the most appropriate value for compensation 
tests involving policies that affect goods traded in markets. 
However many "public" goods, such as environmental quality and open pace amenities, are 
7There is a subtle welfare economic difference in meaning between Clinton's and Congress's 
statements. Clinton's Executive Order follows Reagan's previous order in proclaiming that 
major regulations should simply pass a benefit-cost test. The wording of the Congressional 
statement instead goes a bit further by suggesting the environmental policies be designed at 
"optimal" levels in which the net societal benefits are maximized. Using the terminology in the ­
text, Clinton is promoting a Pareto Improving approach, while Congress is apparently striving for 
Pareto Efficiency. This distinction is moot, however, as the bills mentioned here were passed by 
Congress, but never enacted. 
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not traded in markets and thus do not have a price to serve as a benchmark for valuation -- an 
instance of what economists call market failure. This does not mean that such goods have no value, 
it merely indicates that mark ts cannot be relied upon to send signals reflecting the scarcities of, and 
preferences for, these commodities. Since markets fail to reflect price ignals about the relative 
scarcities of certain goods, it follows that, in the absence of alternative institutional arrangements 
to allocate resources, the allocation of these goods will likely deviate from the optimal allocation if 
all preferences and values were considered. That is, the allocation will be inefficient. In cases where 
positive values are unaccounted for, the environmental commodity will likely be underallocated 
relative to the social optimum. 
For example, as Ready [1993] notes, a scenic "pastoral" view along a country road i said 
to have some value if it brings pleasure to someone driving down the road. Although markets do 
not presently exist for such items (with the exception of park entrance fees), the concept of 
opportunity cost, indifference, and maximum willingness to pay are equally relevant in this instance. 
The difference between the privately purchased land parcel (private good) and the pastoral view 
(public good) is that the driver has probably never had to compare his or her personal value with a 
market price, since he/she does not have to pay for it directly. Moreover, in contrast to purchasing 
a private good, which entitles exclusi e use (other people can't use it without my permission) and 
which is characterized by rivalness (your consumption detracts from my benefits), one viewer's 
consumption of the pastoral view does not take away any value from subsequent viewers, at least 
to the point where congestion becomes an is. ue. Thus many individuals may jointly receive value 
from one scenic view. A' such, the sum of maximum willingness to pay across individuals for 
-

preserving this setting is the appropriate benefit measure in welfare analyses of public goods. If, in 
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the aggregate, these benefits are large, then private land markets that fail to account for these values 
will tend to underallocate land to agriculture [Lopez et al., 1994]. 
A similar logic and possible source of inefficiency extends to public disamenitieS-Of damages 
such as water contamination. In many instances, people would be willing 0 give up scarce resources 
in order to protect themselves from actual or perceived harm. For such situations the damages of 
contamination, or conversely the benefits of protection, can be mea ured by the maximum 
willingness to pay for a program that protects groundwater from contamination. If these benefits are 
large relative to the costs of controlling the polluting activities, then public sector intervention may 
be desirable. 
In a long evolution and expansion of theory [Dupuit, 1844; Kaldor, 1939' Hicks, 1939' 
Hotelling, 1939; Samuelson, 1954; Weisbrod, 1964; Krutilla, 1967; Bradford, 1970], economi ·ts 
have developed the concepts of individual and aggregate willingness to pay for environmental goods 
and bads by utilizing the concept of indifference between policy options and the present state. 
Conceptually, my maximium willingness to pay is the amount of money that would make me just 
as well off with the project (and the payment) as without the project. In other words, the payment 
is the amount of money that just makes me indifferent between policy options. In the last few 
decades economists have develop d techniqu s that try to measure these extra-market willingness­
to-p y values (see Hanemann, 1992; Mitchell and Carson, 1989a; Freeman, 1993 for reviews). 
Although relatively new, these valuation techniques are accepted for use by many U.S. agencies 
including the EPA, various agencies within the Department of Interior, and resource oriented 
agencies within the USDA. Such techniques are also accepted for use in environmental damage 
-

litigation [Kopp and Smith, 1993] and can be divided into "indirect" measures based on market 
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transactions as well as "direct" measures of willingness to pay based on survey methods. For the 
most part, economists tend to be more comfortable with indirect measures, such as travel costs for 
recreational goods or property value shifts for environmental goods and bads, because they rely on 
revealed preferences as expres ed in voluntary market transactions. Thus, my decision to expend 
my money and time on a salmon fishing trip is said to provide an indicator of my worth for thal 
resource. Similarly, decisions about housing purchases and acceptable prices may reflect underlying 
environmental quality. Yet, as will be discussed, such measures exclude some value components. 
As a result, there is an increasing interest and reliance (as well as controversy) on urvey 
methodologies, such as contingent valuation, for directly measuring values. The remainder of this 
paper introduces these techniques through a summary of applications to the extra-market benefits 
and costs of agriculture. 
m. Review of Agricultural Environmental Valuation Research
 
ill.a. The Amenity Benefits of Agricultural Lands
 
In recent decades there has been wide pread legislative effort at local and state levels to directly
 
preserve farmland from conversion to urban and other non-farm uses, and to indirectly protect
 
agricultural land by reducing agriculture's exposure to "unreasonable" regulations and lawsuits
 
associated with residential intrusion into agricultural areas. All 50 states, and a myriad of local
 
entities, have adopted some form of "right to farm" legislation [Bills, 1993] and preferential se­

value assessment programs to reduce farmland property tax burdens [Wunderlich, 1997], while
 
others utilize a circuit breaker taxation approach that offsets state income taxes if the property tax
 
bill exceeds a certain proportion of taxable household income [Barrows, 1986J; several states have
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authorized the adoption of local zoning ordinances that restrict land use to agriculture [Rose, 1984], 
and still others have established purchase of development rights (PDR) programs to compensate 
farmers for unrealized financial gains that could have been obtained by converting land to non­
agricultural uses Buist et al., 1995]. In many areas, this blend of public protection policies ha. been 
supplanted by substantial private efforts to purchase development rights [Weibe et al., 1996]. 
While the motivations for establishing farmland protection programs differ across programs 
[Gardner, 1977; Rose, 1984; Furu eth, 1987; Kline and Wilchens, 1994], Gardner effectively argues 
that market failure, and hence a justification for public intervention, is only found in the case of 
environmental and open-space considerations. AJI other motivations such as food sufficiency, rural 
viability, maintaining the farming way of life and other "nostalgic" or "agrarian" motivations are 
primarily associated with equity concerns, and, as such, do not correspond to standard economic 
justifications for public intervention. 
In spite of Gardner's off-cited objections, there is substantial public intervention, and 
substantial public and private monies are being devoted to farmland protection, apparently for 
motivations including and beyond providing environmental amenities. For example, cumulative 
expenditures for state and local PDR programs in 14 states have exceeded $644 million through 
1994, while contributions to American Farmland Trust approach $4 million per annum [American 
Farmland Trust, 1996]. Tax shifts from exempt to non-exempt parcels associated with agricultural 
use-value assessments exceed $40 million per anDum in New York alone [1 YSDAM, 1996] while 
the Conservation Title of the 1996 FAIR promises $35 million to be invested in the purcha e of 
development rights over a even-year period. In the aggregate, the combined public and private 
-

expenditures for the purposes of preserving agricultural land are not inconsequential. However, one 
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must be cautious about interpreting revealed government preferences and expenditures as a measure 
of societal willingness to pay. Frequently this level of expenditures is determined by legislatures, 
begging the question of how effectively political decision making reflects the preferences of 
individuals in society. Even when direct referenda are used, as in bond referenda in Massachusetts, 
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and other states [Kline and Wilchens, 1996J the conditions for voting 
models to optimally allocate resources, and truly represent social willingness to pay, are quite 
stringent and unlikely to be met in most instances [Stiglitz, 1988]. Similarly, voluntary 
contributions, such as donations to land trusts, are not expected to reveal willingness to pay for 
farmland protection [Boadway and Wildasen, 1984]. 
Instead, economists have turned to the "non-market" contingent valuation technique in order 
to directly estimate the value of amenity benefits. The contingent valuation method uses in-person, 
mail, or phone surveys to ask about the values people would place on specified improvements in 
environmental commodities if ideal markets did exist or other means of payment were in effect. 
Initially suggested by Ciriacy-Wantrup in 1947, it is only in the last two decades that this t chnique 
has been widely used by resource economists. As of 1995, over 2,000 studies had been reported 
[Carson, et al. 1995J. In spite of its widespread use, much concern has been raised recently about 
the validity of contingent valuation, especially in the wake of applications of, and subsequent attacks 
on, this technique to the Exxon Valdez oil spill [Harvard Law Review, 1992; Hausman, 1993]. On 
one hand, a number of validity studies comparing contingent values to actual market transactions 
demonstrate that, if the study is well done and addresses a familiar commodity, the contingent 
valuation technique can provide reasonable estimates of actual values for public goods [Bishop and 
Heberlein, 1990; Hanemann, 1994], although there is some concern even among supporters that such 
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validity does not hold for goods with large non-use components [Brown et al., 1996]. On the other 
hand, detractors have argued that these hypothetical questions provide hypothetical values, which 
are too biased and unreliable to make critical environmental decisions which may have billion dollar 
consequences [Desvousges et al., 1993; Diamond and Hausman, 1994]. The controversial nature 
of this technique led the ational Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) to 
organize a "blue ribbon panel", consisting of two Nobel laureates in economics and other eminent 
scholars, to consider whether this technique is an appropriate method for determining lost passive 
use values associated with oil spills. Although concern was raised a out certain aspects of this 
approach, this panel concluded that contingent valuation studies "convey useful information ... 
[and] can produce estimates reliable enough to be the starting point of a judicial proces. " [Arro let 
al., 1993, p. 4610].8 The findings of this panel are widely used by Federal and State gendes whose 
scope does not include oil-related issues. 
With respect to the contingent valuation applications to agricultural lands, willingness-to-pay 
values have been elicited for protecting farmland from further urban encroachment or development. 
A summary of the farmland amenity value contingent valuation studies that have been conducted in 
the United States is provided in Table 1. Comparisons across studies demonstrate a wide variation 
in estimated annual household willingness to pay, ranging from $7 to $252. Explanatory variables 
included in individual studies, as well as comparisons of average values reported across studie', 
suggest that several factors have been found to affect willingness-to-pay estimates and offer insight 
8 For a discussion and criticism of the contingent vaJuation technique, the reader is referred to 
symposia in Choices [1993, Second Quarter] and in the Joumal ofEconomic Perspectives [Fall, 
1994]. Mitchell and Carson [1989a] provide an excellent, albeit somewhat dat d, overview of 
this technique, and Bjornstrad and Kahn, 1996, provide a fairly current perspective on 
methodological issues and research needs. 
14 
to the source of this dispersion in values. Notably, willingness to pay rises with the ratio of urban 
to agricultural land in the region and the degree of perceived threat to agricultural lands, a factor that 
partly accounts for the disparity in values found between the estimated values in South Carolina and 
Massachusetts. For example, in discussing the low estimates found intbeir study of.agricultural 
lands in South Carolina, Bergstrom et aI., [1985] note that the study area is "located in a 
predominantly rural area: alternative supplies of agricultural land are not difficult to find" (p. 146). 
All studies demonstrated" cope" a concern raised about contingent valuation [Arrow et al., 1993], 
in that agricultural programs that protected more farms or acres were valued equally or more highly 
than programs that protected less farmland. Standard explanatory variables in estimating 
willingness-to-pay functions generally demonstrated the expected sign (e.g., income and education 
were non-negative) and reasonable orders of magnitude. 
Researchers also note that quality/quantity issues may be important determinants in estimated 
willingness-to-pay values. That is, the type of agriculture being protected is at least as important as 
the amount of land or number of farms being protected. For instance, Ready [1993] argues that 
estimates of av rage willingness t pay for protecting horse farms in Kentucky are higher than those 
found in other farmland protection studies because Kentuckians have a particular affinity for horse 
farming. Similar arguments might be associated with nostalgic or scenic motivations attributed to 
smaller farm operations, and an aversion to farms that produce unsightly or odorous outputs. A 
second quality issue raised in these studies is the fact that it is not clear whether these willingness-to­
pay values are for farmland preservation per se, or if the values are motivated by a broader need for 
open pace. While in some areas farmland and open space pres rvation are synonymous, in other 
areas a conflict between the two land uses may arise. Obviously such research suffers from a lack 
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of product differentiation, and both these limitations should be taken into account when considering 
policies that will affect the total land in farming as well as the composition of the farm sector. 
It should be noted that other non-market valuation techniques are available, but ha e not yet 
been used, for estimating components of societal values attributed to preserving farmland. F r 
example, in areas in which tourism is motivated, in part, by open-space environmental amenities or 
nostalgic preferences associated with agriculture (e.g., Pennsylvania Dutch Country or Vermont), 
recreational trip expenditures might be used as a proxy for estimating consumer willingness to pay. 
As noted previously, this so-called travel cost method has some appeal, because it relie on actual, 
rather than hypothetical, decisions made in related markets9 . Another related markets approach 
called hedonic pricing or property values, might be to look at how property prices vary with 
proximity to agricultural lands 10. If proximity to agricultural land is a d sirable component of a 
house, then housing markets should reflect this characteristic: in the sense that, after accounting for 
other features, homes that are closer to agricultural areas should be valued more highly than homes 
that are more distant. To a certain extent the reverse has been found in selected research, suggesting 
that proximity to agriculture (or at least certain types of agriculture) may reduce housing values and 
cause economic losses. For example, Palmquist et ai. [1997] found a statistically significant 
reduction in housing prices associated with the proximity and the number of hogs in rural North 
9 The travel cost model was originally sugge. ted by H. Hotellinb in a letter to the National 
Park service in 1947. Rudimentary introductions to this method are found in Ander on and 
Bishop [1986] with greater detail provided in Bockstael [1995]. 
10 Although the concept of measuring the value of components in differentiated consumer 
products traces back to Court [1941], Ridk r [1967] is generally recognized as the first 
economist to use residential property values as the basis for estimating the benefits of changes in 
measure of environmental quality, such as air pollution. See Freeman [1993] for a theoretical 
and historical overview. 
16
 
Carolina. Abeles-Allison and Connor [1990] report similar results for residential land near Michigan 
hog operations. 
In all, while there is a strong indication that amenity benefits may be substantial, there is still 
much research left to be conducted in the measurement of these values in order to disentangle the 
motivations for valuing farmland preservation. As society's needs and the composition of 
agriculture change, then so must perceptions of the desirable quantity and type of agriculture. Socio­
economic research efforts need to be directed toward establishing a better understanding of society's 
evolving preferences about agriculture and agricultural land use, and toward identifying the value 
of the different components of farmland and agriculture li . From a policy perspective, an equally 
important issue at the local level i to compare these perceived benefits of protecting agricultural 
land with the perceived costs of certain gricultural practices discussed below. 
m.b. The Costs of Groundwater Contamination 
Agricultural contamination of groundwater is the dominant agricultural environmental policy issue 
in many areas. Nationwide, the Environmental Protection Agency has detected the pre ence of 74 
pesticides in groundwater in 38 states [USEPA, 1988], and a 1990 United States Department of 
Agriculture study projected that as many as 53.8 million people could be negatively affected by 
agricultural contamination of groundwater [Lee and Nielsen, 1987; Nielsen and Lee, 1981]. More 
Ii One promising valuation approach in this direction is conjoint analysis which is a variant of 
the contingent valuation approach which allows the investigator to infer implicit prices based on 
choices made from a designated set of multi attribute alternatives [Louviere, 1988]. Value for 
the different attributes can be derived from choices or rankings if one of the.attributes varied is 
the price of the commodity [Roe et al., 1996; Mackenzie, 1993]. Farmland valuation re earch 
using this technique is currently underway in Delaware [Mackenzie, 1996], with similar re earch 
being conducted in Europe [Bergland, 1997; Hanley et al.. 1997]. 
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recent analyses suggest that the actual, as opposed to the potential, exposure is likely to be less 
extensive [e.g., Kellogg et al., 1992]. But it should be noted that nitrates and agricultural pesticides 
remain leading sources of public and private supplies lUSEPA, 1994], that violations of nitrate 
health standards in residential wells are substantially higher in agricultural than non~agricultural 
areas [Mueller et al., 1995, Nolan and Ruddy, 1996], that nitrate levels in groundwater respond to 
changes in fertilizer use [Mueller and Helsel, 1996] particularly in areas with well drained soils 
[Nolan and Ruddy, 1996], and that evidence suggests that nitrate levels in wells are continuing to 
rise in agricultural areas [Mueller and Helsel, 1996]. 
In fact, and in public perception, it is clear that agricultural contamination of groundwater 
is no longer simply a problem of farmers polluting their own wells. Public opinion polls have long 
demonstrated that people perceive agricultur I practices as a problem affecting their well being. For 
example, a poll in Iowa found that 52 percent of those surveyed identified farm chemicals as the 
major threat to drinking water, and 78 percent favored limiting the amount of fertilizers, herbicides, 
and insecticides that farmers could use even if such action resulted in reduced agricultural production 
[Batie, 1988]. 
The costs of groundwater contamination have not been adequately addressed at the regional 
or national level, and have not been traced back to practices on individual farms. However, there 
are some strong indications that economic damages a sociated with degradation in groundwater 
quality are being incurred because of agricultural practices. In some areas of the United States, 
public wells have been closed beeau e of nitrate and pesticide contamination, neighbors are suing 
farmers for contaminating the groundwater, cities and towns are annexing lands to protect their well 
beads, households with contamination are investing in water purification systems, and banks are 
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requiring safe drinking water tests for nitrates. All these actions serve as indicators that society i 
willing to give up scarce resources to protect its drinking water from agricultural contamination. In 
other words, there are economic costs associated with groundwater contamination. 
Over the years, economists have applied various techniques to estimate the magnitude of 
these damages in dollar terms. One approach has been to use averting costs as a proxy for damages. 
For example, how much would a household have to pay to clean its water if it were determined to 
be contaminated? Using these techniques, studies suggest that the damages associated with 
removing nitrates and pesticides from water may exceed several hundreds of dollars per year 
depending on the option selected and the number of people in the household [Lee and Nielsen, 
1987]. For example, Table 2 provides estimates of some of these costs for households in orthern 
New York. In examining water related health risks, Raucher D983, 1986] correctly argues that water 
treatment costs do not, however, adequately reflect maximum willingness to pay for water quality l2. 
Damages avoided should include costs of illness avoided. Harrington et aI., [1991] provide evidence 
ugge ting that these costs (lost wages, doctor bills etc.), when aggregated across an affected 
population may be much larger than water treatment costs. An analysis by Abdalla et al., [1992]. 
further indicates that studies which quantify actual treatment costs undertaken as a proxy for 
willingness to pay may further understate the true level of damages if there is a low awareness of 
contamination and thus a low level of adopting averting behavior. 
A second possible approach to valuing the cost of groundwater contamination would be to 
12 The literature cited here focuses specifically on groundwater quality. This represents only a 
portion of the substantial literature on the relationship between averting co ts, damages avoided, 
and "true" willingness to pay. Major papers in this area include Courant and Porter [1981], 
Harrington and Portney [1987], Bartik [1988] Berger et al. [1987], Shogren and Crocker [1991], 
and Quiggen [1992]. Toll y et al. [1994] provides a good literature review and starting point for 
this topic. 
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examine the effects on private property values, under the assumption that homeowners are willing 
to accept a lower price when selling their homes in order to avoid the risk of drinking contaminated 
water and that buyers similarly prefer houses without contamination. From an economic perspective 
the reduction in property value would be approximately equal to. the amount that a household would 
be willing to pay to avoid such exposure13 . Whereas some studies have found that residential values 
are reduced if a site is near a sanitary landfill, a hazardous waste site, or hog farms [e.g., McClelland 
et al., 1990; Reichart et at., 1992, Palmquist et al., 1997], other research that has focused on the 
relationship between actual contamination levels and the value of residential properties has faun 
little or no effect of contamination on property values [Page and Rabinowitz, 1993; Malone and 
Barrows, 1990]. These latter studies note, however, that the lack of a statistically significant 
relationship between contamination and property values may be attributed to other factors in the 
study design, location, and analysis. 
In addition to the limitations or biases associated with empirical estimates of the avoided 
costs and the property value approaches, it is likely that the costs of groundwater contamination 
exceed estimated cost that are based on a erting expenditures or changes in property values. R call 
that from an economic perspective the benefits of a project that reduces groundwater contamination 
are equal to the maximum amount that individuals would be willing to pay in order to experience 
that reduction. With respect to averting expenditures, bottled or treated water may not be perceived 
as a perfect substitut for pure unpolluted water, and individuals may be willing to pay much more 
for groundwater protection than they would be for groundwater treatment [Blomquist et al., 1997]. 
Averting expenditures and property value reductions might also underestimate true willingness to 
-

13 As noted in the previous section, this property value, or hedonic, method is detailed in 
Freeman [1993]. 
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pay for groundwater protection because individuals may also value groundwater protection for 
stewardship, altruistic, or bequest motivations [O'Neil and Raucher, 1990]. Such moti es have been 
demonstrated for groundwater protection LMitchell and Carson, 1989b] and exert a substantial effect 
on willingness to pay [Edwards, 1988]. In addition to these non-use motivations, households may 
be worried about their exposure levels outside the home, such as at school, at work, at restaurants, 
or at a neighbor's home, which would further drive a wedge between household a erting costs and 
true willingness to pay. 
Recognizing these limitations, several contingent valuation studies have been conducted to 
try to estimate the total value of groundwater contamination (or conversely the benefits of 
protection). Results from these studies indicate that the average annual willingness to pay for 
protection of groundwater from contaminants may be in the one to several hundred dollar range. 
Agriculturally related water contamination studies which reported willingness-to-pay values for 
protecting groundwater contamination levels from exceeding government standards are presented 
in the top portion of Table 3 14 • In addition to the average values reported, a statistical "meta" 
analysis across the willingness-to-pay values reported in these studies determined that willingness 
to pay is positively correlated with exposure risks: households with high levels of exposure were 
willing to pay much more for protection than households with low levels of exposure [Boyle et al., 
1994]. Again, this raises the point observed in amenity valuation that the perceived benefits of 
alternative policie. will vary across sites and conununities, depending on the existing level of 
14 The data in this table represent a subset of groundwater quality contingent valuation studies 
reported in the U.S. but are not provided here because either they did not focus on the safety 
threshold, e.g., Zoysa [1995] or were not directly associated with agricultural contamination 
[Edwards, 1988; Shultz and Lindsay, 1990; Caudill, 1992; Jordan and EI Nagheeb, 1993; 
McClelland et al., 1992; and Barrett, et ai., 1996]. 
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contamination. Estimated values in these studies were also affected, in expected directions, by 
survey design characteristics (e.g., elicitation method, infonnation provided) and socio-economic 
attributes (e.g., income, price of substitutes). 
In comparing the values associated with contamination to the benefit of agriculture, Poe 
and Bishop [1992] estimated that the damages associated with groundwater contamination from 
nitrates cOITesponded to less than 7 percent of the net returns to farming in the county. In another 
comparison, Smith [1992] estimated that the value of the crops produced was about 16 times the 
costs associated with groundwater contamination from agricultural practices in states that had 
counties with potential agricultural contamination. Whether these cost seem large or small i a 
matter of personal perspecti e. 
Moreover, it may be that such broad comparisons are largely iITelevant for the compensati n 
test criteria. Instead, from a policy perspective, it would be more appropriate to compare incremental 
benefits and costs associated with alternative agricultural practices [Burrows, 1995; Conrad and 
Olsen, 1992]. In some instances small changes in practices might lead to substantial reductions in 
contamination, and hence have very high benefit to cost ratios. In others, very costly changes in 
practices might result in fairly low benefits. Towards this goal, two contingent valuation studies 
have provided estimates on one unit changes in exposure levels, which would enable a comparison 
of incremental benefits and costsl 5. These studies are depicted in the lower part of Table 3. 
Unfortunately, as noted previously, economists, hydrologists, and agronomists have not yet linked 
15 The value reported from the Poe and Bishop study [1994] is the maximum willingness-to­
pay value associated with the steepest part of the total damages curve, which occurred in the area 
•
where the exposure reductions would cross a government safety limit of 10 mg/1. That is, a<; 
expected from economic theory with substitution alternatives, the total damage function is a non­
linear sigmoid shape that is initially convex but reaches a plateau. Marginal damages approach 
zero at both low and high levels of exposure. 
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the values associated with groundwater contamination back to the fann level, and thus such a 
comparison remains an important area of future research. 
m.c. The Costs of Soil Erosion 
Soil erosion has on-site and off-site costs; both of which are generally not ac ounted for in the 
market. On-site costs of erosion are primarily associated with the long-term impact of soil loss on 
productivity potential. Excessive erosion diminishes this potential by reducing nutrient supply, water 
infiltration, and soil water holding capacity, which have economic consequences in terms of lost 
productivity. 
Conceptually, erosion related reductions in land productivity will have a negative impact on 
land values (e.g., McConnell, 1983; Saliba and Bromley, 1986). However, this finding ha not been 
universally supported in land valuation studies. Some empirical investigations have concluded that 
reductions in soil depth and/or potential erosivity are associated with lower land values (e.g., 
Palmquist and Danielson, 1989; Miranowski and Hammes, 1985). Other research indicates that 
there is a market failure, in that conservation investments and reduced erosion are not capitalized 
into land values (e.g., Ervin and Mill, 1985; Gardner and Barrows, 1985). Given the evidence that 
on-site costs are not universally apparent in markets, direct measures of soil loss productivity have 
been u. ed to quantify the economic consequences of ero ion. One method of evaluating productivity 
losses is to estimate soil depth and yield relations for individual soils. These "microstudies" compare 
the yields on land that has had varying levels of topsoil removed with the yields on undisturbed land 
of the same soil type. Aggregating the results from a number of soil loss microstudies, Lyles 
[1975] arrived at an average linear yield reduction per inch of top soi1105t equal to 6.3 percent (s.d. 
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=1.3 percent). In a separate review, Langdale and Schrader [1982] found a much wider variation in 
obs r ed yield loss: ranging from over 6 percent per inch of soil lost in one study to no observed 
effect when 10 inches of top soil were removed in another study. The principal conclusion to be 
drawn from these microstudies is that productivity losses from erosion are ite and soil specific. 
An alternative approach of estimating the impacts of soil loss on crop productivity foeu es 
on the average impacts of cropland erosion at a regional or national level. These "macrostudies" are 
generally reported in terms of percentage reductions in potential productivity per period of time for 
an entire region. Using this approach, the USDA estimated that productivity losses associated with 
1977 erosion rates were approximately 8 percent over 50 years [USDA, 1981]; a University of 
Minnesota model estimated that the average change in productivity for each of the Major Land 
Resource Areas in the Corn Belt ranged from 1.0 to 4.9 percent over 50 years [Pierce et al., 1984]; 
and a Resources for the Future study estimated that 1980 corn and soybean production wa 2-3 
percent lower than it would have been without erosion in the period from 1950-1980 [Crosson and 
Stout, 1983]. 
Off-site costs of soil erosion and erosion related pollutants are incurred by the public and can 
be separated into in-stream damages (biologic 1impacts, recreational impacts, water storage damage, 
navigation, and other "preservation values") and off-stream effects (flood damage, sediments in 
water conveyance, water treatment). St tistics compiled by the Environmental Protection Agency 
indicate that agricultural erosion and runoff are leading causes of surface water impairment and that 
agricultural nonpoint source pollution is the largest remaining water quality problem in the United 
States: individual states attribute 41 percent of their nonpoint source pollution problems to 
-

agriculture, and 60 percent of the nation's impaired river miles are impacted by agricultural runoff 
24
 
and erosion [USEPA, 1994]. 
In a series of papers, Clark, Ribaudo, and co-authors (1985, 1989, 1994] have sought to 
combine secondary data from defensive expenditure studies, incremental cost of production studies, 
travel cost, and other recreational studies to provide an estimate of off-site costs associated with 
erosion. As Table 4 suggests, the estimated average off- ite costs per ton of soil erosion are 
substantial and are not uniform across the country. The wide deviations in these estimated costs 
across cropping regions are primarily attributed to regional differences in the demand for surface 
water. For example, with high population concentrations and high demands for in-stream and 
withdrawal uses of water, the Northeast has relatively high off-site damages per ton of soil eroded. 
In contrast, although the aggregate levels of soil erosion are much higher in the Northern Plains and 
the Mountain States, the average damages per ton are much lower due to lower demands for surface 
water. This finding is important. It demonstrates that, at a national level the value of a lon of soil 
loss is not a constant because different populations with different uses of the resource are affected. 
What is evident at the national level is also likely to occur within states, watersheds, and even sub­
watersheds. Importantly, these site-specific results hold for all other extra-market benefits and co ts. 
In general, off-site costs of agricultural erosion exceed the on-site costs of erosion by a factor 
of 2 to 8. For example, Crosson and Stout [1983) estimate that the national on-site costs of 
agricultural soil erosion to be $600 to $800 million annually. For comparison, Clark [1985J 
estimates that the national off-site costs of agricultural erosion are at least $2.2 billion annually. 
This widely used relationship between on- and off-site costs of erosion is, however, 
challenged by a Pimentel et al. [1995] study which argues that national costs greatly exceed those 
discussed above: i.e. national annual on-site costs are $27 billion while off-site costs are $17 billion. 
25
 
This translates into an average cost per acre of $79. The ggregated co ts are at lea t an order of 
magnitude higher than those cited previously, and, quite notably, result in an inversion of the ratio 
between on and off-site costs. Differences in the estimates between this and previous research may 
be attributed, in part, to alternative approaches to estimating losses. For example, the on-site losses 
in Pimentel et al. [1995] are based on the asset replacement approach increasingly being promoted 
by proponents of Natural Resource Accounting (e.g., Repetto, 1994). In this approach values of 
complete replacement of nutrients and soil water associated with erosion are used instead of 
observed or modeled losses in productivity. The off-site costs also include wind erosion and health 
effects. While these new estimates raise concerns that current cost estimates used in evaluating 
government programs may underestimate the true costs, substantive criticism about assumptions and 
methods used in this study, and related studies, have been raised [Crosson, 1995; National Research 
Council, 1989]. It is also important to note that such an approach deviates from the conventional 
economics approach based on preferences and maximum willingness to pay. 
Taking data from Ribaudo's [1989] research, Table 5 translates on-site and off-site e timates 
of costs to the farm level for soil conditions and three different crop rotations that might be found 
in Southwestern Wisconsin. Using continuous corn as an example, a farm with 200 acres of 
cropland eroding at 7.9 tons per acre could result in $6,372 in on and off-site costs per year. From 
the perspective of the compensation test, the important question in examining these costs is, Do they 
matter? In other words, would farm production decisions change if farmers took these costs into 
account. The answer depends on many factors. 
For example, in comparing costs taken from Ribaudo [1989] with the profitability of 
alternative rotations on an individual farm basis, Poe et al. [1991] found that the change in profits 
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from adopting less erosive rotations would be less than the social benefit associated with reduced 
erosion for those Wisconsin farmers who did not participate in government commodity programs. 
The benefit-cost relationship was reversed, however, for farmers who did participate in government 
commodity programs. Similarly, Leathers [1991) examined the costs and benefits of installing Soil 
Conservation Service best management practices on individual farms in Maryland, and found that 
the costs of adopting practices exceeded the social benefits of reducing erosion in 28 percent of the 
cases studied. In both these studies, it is important to recognize that the production changes 
investigated involved relatively large investments or shifts in practices. It is likely that more 
marginal changes in production, such as contour plowing or strip cropping, might incur relatively 
low production costs but result in large societal benefits. 
Similar "mixed" results have been found when comparing benefits and costs of controlling 
agricultural runoff and sedimentation at regional and national levels. Using benefit estimates of 
reducing off-site erosion, related to those in Table 4, Ribaudo et at. [1994) concluded that, at the 
national level, costs of erosion control through a major, regionally balanced land retirement program 
would likely exceed the benefits. However, these authors also concluded that the benefits of a 
carefully targeted program could approach or exceed costs. A similar conclusion is reached by Lyon 
and Farrow [1995), who instead employed Carson and Mitchell's [1993) contingent valuation 
estimates of willingness to pay for water quality improvements. Their analysis concluded that the 
incremental benefits exceeded the costs associated with planned Clean WaterAct programs. They 
imply, however, that targeted programs addressing agricultural non-point source pollution may result 
in positive net benefits in individual watersheds. 
-
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IV. Discussion 
This paper has provided a rationale for measuring agricultural environmental extra-market values, 
and incorporating these values into policy design and evaluation. Given this conceptual base, a 
review of applications of valuation techniques to select agricultural environmental issues was 
provided. Three key points should be taken from this review. First, extra-market value associated 
with agricultural amenity benefits and costs linked to surface and ground water contamination are 
large, and thus merit policy consideration 16. Second, these benefits and costs occur jointly: an 
agricultural parcel may concurrently convey public benefits as well as impose public costs. And 
third, perceived benefits and costs may vary across sites and affe ted populations: amenity bene Its 
associated with protecting farmland have been shown to vary with the perceived scarcity or threat 
to farmland and type of farm operation, as well as systematic features of the population surveyed; 
agricultural damages to ground and surface waters are affected not only by the degree of impairment 
or load but also by the use of the resource and the characteristics of the population affected. 
Combined, these three key issues suggest that there will be a widely varying mosaic of benefit-cost 
ratios associated with agricultural land use across localities. 
Elements of this mosaic need to be taken into account in designing a set of policies intended 
to maximize the environmental and social benefits of agricultural land use. Clearly, the magnitude 
16 Current policy topics (and their 1996 FAIR Programs) such as wetlands use (the Wetlands 
Reserve Program), wildlife habitat protection (the Wildlife Habitats Incentive Program) and off-site 
costs of manure (Environmental Quality Incentives Program) have been and are being valued by 
economists. At the time this paper was written, however, a sufficient body of valuation literature 
on these subjects had not emerged. In some cases, like wetlands, much research has been conducted 
(e.g., Anderson and Rockel, 1991) but has typically focused on a narrow part of the entire issue (e.g., 
Whitehead and Blomquist, 1991) and has yet to be brought together in a cohe ive or meaningful ­
manner. Other resources, like the wildlife benefits of agricultural easement lands or the costs of 
livestock operations, are in a nascent stage with rust studies being either conducted (e.g., Boyle, 
1997) or recently completed (e.g., Palmquist et aI., 1997). 
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and variety of agricultural environmental market failure extends beyond the scope of a single 
program such as the Farm Bill. Instead, as has already occurred to some extent, an overlapping 
hierarchy of local, state, and Federal programs needs to be developed to address the joint and 
concurrent nature of agricultural environmental benefits and costs. 
The policy challenge is to develop a cohesive set of programs that individually, and jointly, 
recognize that agricultural land use practices convey both benefits and costs [Harvey 1991; Poe, 
1997a]. At all levels, policymakers have tended to identify separate and disconnected policies to 
protect farmland and to protect water quality. Within each level it is essential that policies be better 
coordinated so that farmland protection efforts are viewed as a part of water quality programs and 
vice versa. For instance, farmland protection efforts such as the 1996 FAIR Farmland Protection 
Program should explicitly account for water quality and other "negative externalities" in developing 
an easement site ranking program. Similarly, conservation and environmental programs should 
consider amenity values in making enrollment acceptance criteria. At present, such considerations 
have not entered into rule making, and programs largely continue to proceed independently. To a 
degree, the development of separate and often conflicting programs mirrors academic research on 
land use practices cited, which tends to focus on only one side of the benefit-cost equation at a time. 
For instance, a study of the amenity benefits side of agriculture concluded that "land is under 
allocated to agriculture" [Lopez et al., 1994]. In a striking contrast, a study of the benefits and costs 
of erosion control concluded that "land retirement as a primary pollution control tool is expensive, 
but if appropriately targeted, could generate sufficient benefits (i.e., reduced off-site costs) to 
outweigh social costs" [Ribaudo et al., 1994]. In alTiving at these competing conclusions, neither 
-

analysis considered both sides of the benefits (open space) to costs (water quality) relationship. 
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Coordination of policies may require explicit changes through rule miling, but may also 
require "top level" efforts to coordinate agency actions (e.g. Moore, 1997). Furthermore, public 
policy making in agriculture may need to evolve away from an either/or bifurcation of policy 
interventions along purely regulatory (e.g., 1990 Coastal Zone Management Act Reauthorization 
Amendments) or voluntary (e.g., 1996 FAIR) lines to more integrated programs that recognize the 
joint needs or rights of the agricultural and non-agricultural publics. Several recent "mixed right" 
policy innovations have been developed in state and local experiments. Promising examples include: 
only imposing regulations when observed inputs (e.g., cows per acre: Pennsylvania) or outputs (e.g., 
nitrates in groundwater: Nebraska) cross a given threshold; linking property tax credits to adoption 
of conservation practices (e.g., Conservation Credit lntitiative: Wisconsin); targeting priority 
watersheds based on use and population affected (e.g., Florida Everglades or New York City 
Watershed); trading pollution credits; or regulating only bad actors [Poe, 1997a]. Effort should also 
be taken to coordinate efforts across policy levels. This may involve explicit local, state, and Federal 
interagency cooperation (e.g., New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, 1997). 
It may also require resolution of conflicting incentives sent to farmers by different governmental 
levels such as local tax policies inhibiting participation in Federal conservation easement programs 
[Poe, 1997b]. 
It is equally incumbent upon researchers to take steps towards integrating the various 
environmental benefits and costs attributed to agricultural land use to engender less myopic policy 
recommendations. This may prove difficult as, all too often, funding and research interests are 
driven by immediate policy problems. For instance, economists jumped on the erosion bandwagon 
-

in the early 1980's and followed the policy money toward groundwater contarninatjon in the later part 
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of the decade. More thought. as well as funding, needs to be directed towards creating a longer term 
holistic framework for research and a more encompassing perspective on agricultural environmental 
and social relationships. Only when an integrated research agenda has een established can an 
informed policy be developed so as to meet the FAIR intent to "maximize the environmental 
benefits per dollar expended" as well as meet the broader policy mandate of "maximizing the 
benefits to whomsoever they may accrue". 
-
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Table 1: Willingnes to Pay (WTP) for Amenity Benefits of Agricultural Land 
Aggregate 
Authors (Date) Location Good Average Annual Annual 
Bergstrom. Greenville Co. General Farmland 
WTP/Household ($) 
7-12 
WTPI Acre ($) 
18-44 
Dillman and Stoll SC 
(1985) 
Halstead (1984) 3 Counties General Farmland 34-230 56-492 
MA 
Waddington (J 990) PA General Farmland 80-106 n.a. 
Ready (J 993) KY Horse Farms 73-252 n.a. 
Note: Dollar Values Converted to 1990 Using the Consumer Price Index.. Average WTP values vary in some studies 
because different subgroups were included or different protection levels were elicited. 
Table 2: Estimated Costs of Household Remedial Responses 
to Reduce Agricultural Chemicals in Drinking Water 
Option Estimated Costs per Year 
Water Treatment Unit: 
Distillation PN $360 (lease) 
Ion Exchange N $360 (lease) 
Reverse Osmosis P . N $216 - 580 (renUlease) 
Bottled Water P . N $160-175 per person per year delivered to home 
Source:	 Poe. Duroe, and van Es, Malone Area Well Water Study. 1995 
P= Pesticide. N= Nitrates 
• 
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Table 3: Willingness to Pay (WTP) for Groundwater Protection from Agricultural Contamination 
($/householdlyear) 
Authors (Date) Location Contaminants Average Annual WTP 
($) 
WTP for "safe" water 
Powell (1991) 15 Communities: 
MA, PA, NY 
General, including 
agricultural sources 
55 
Jordan and EI Nagheeb 
(1993) 
GA Nitrates 142-184 
Poe 
(1993) 
Portage Co., WI Nitrates 211-353 
Sun, Bergstrom, and 
Dorfman 
(1992) 
Delavan 
(1997) 
Dougherty Co., GA 
South Eastern, PA. 
Nitrates and P sticides 
Nitrates. 
493-890 
25-59 
WTP for a one-unit improvement 
Poe and Bishop 
(1994) 
Portage Co., WI Nitrates 102 
Sparco (1995) Sussex Co., DEL Nitrates 
Atrazine 
112 
298 
Note:	 Dollar values converted to 1990 by Consumer Price Index. Average WTP values vary in some studies because 
different subgroups were included or different base levels of exposure were produced; 
*DeJavan's values are for a reduction in probability of exceeding standards form a "staus quo" 50 percent to 
a reduced exposure risk of 25 percent 
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Table 4: Off-Site Damages per Ton of Soil Erosion and per Acre of Farmland by Farm Production Region 
Farm Production Region Erosion (1.000 tons) Damages per ton ($) Damages per Acre ($) 
Northeast 185,000 780 2762 
Delta States 234,000 2.70 13.92 
Appalachian 484,000 1.56 11.37 
Lake States 181,000 4.13 11.05 
Southeast 250,000 2.12 9.94 
Com Belt 970,000 1.27 862 
Pacific 669,000 2.73 7.29 
Southern Plains 490,000 2.23 508 
Mountain States 1,003,600 1.24 2.32 
Northern Plains 671,000 0.63 177 
Source:	 Ribaudo, M., 1989. Dollar values updated to 1990 by Consumer Price Index. 
Table 5: USLE Values and On· and OfT·Site Costs of Erosion ($) 
USLE 
(T/A) 
On-Site 
Costs/ 
Acre 
Off-Site 
Costs/ 
Acre 
Continuous Corn 
Corn/Corn/Corn/ 
Small GrainIHaylHay 
Corn/Corn/Small GrainIHayIHay 
7.9 
2.0 
0.5 
9.19 
2.33 
0.58 
22.67 
5.74 
1.44 
Note:	 USLE Assumptions: 8 percent 200-foot slope; 20 percent residue cover; contour strip cropping where 
appropriate; fall plowing; Rosetta silt-loam soil. On-site costs calculated following Poe et aI., Review of 
Agricultural Economics [1991]; 20 year time horizon, 2 percent discount rate. 
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